El Mirage Accident

[Don]

Does anyone know how Dennis is doing after his accident at El Mirage?

[stebbins]

I don't know how he is doing, but will post an accident report shortly. I also am interested to know how he's doing....

[stebbins]

On Sunday, November 4th, I witnessed an accident at El Mirage Dry Lake. Here is my accident report. (I tried to be cold and dispassionate. If that offends, my apologies.) And I know we usually leave names off here, but we all know who had the accident. It is in the first post on this thread!

Pilot (I don't know Dennis personally, so his info below is sketchy.):
Dennis Johnson
H3? H4? (I'd guess a high 3, but could be wrong.)
I think he is current USHPA
Pilot learned originally on a flex-wing

Accident:
11/4/07 (Sunday)
El Mirage Dry Lake, CA
2800 feet
Aerotow
Hospitalized overnight (almost certainly - probably still there)

Glider:
Atos (older version of some kind)
Rigid Wing Hang Glider

Circumstances:
Aerotow on dry lakebed. Pilot was signed of recently (yesterday?) for aerotow.
Light winds (2-3mph?) at time of accident, straight in to slight left cross.
Winds had been stronger earlier (10?)
The weather was pretty benign. Not at all soarable, light to moderate winds. Level ground with no obstacles or turbulence inducing terrain.
Lakebed is wide-open and flat flat flat. Some small brush, but not right near the towing.

Before flight:
Pilot had been ignoring advice from other (more experienced) pilots all day. When the suggestion was made that rigid wings needed a person on the wing until up to control speed, pilot declined. (I think the expression used was "until you get airspeed, you are a passenger in roll.") Previous flights had been fine, except that early in each roll-out, there was a decided lack of roll control.

One previous flight had, however, been aborted quite early. The pilot entered a right turn and the weak link broke or the pilot released. Pilot was (just) able to level the glider before landing (hard.) Pilot claimed that the rope on the cart caught his base-tube flap controls (or some other part of the basetube.) The rope he meant is the one that the pilot holds onto before launch. Other pilots expressed skepticism that this was the case. This observer expressed extreme skepticism. I can't see how that rope could have caught. It just isn't long enough. Nonetheless, the pilot insisted, and others shortened this rope a bit.

Tug pilot told pilot that rigid wings had no or little roll control until they had sufficient airspeed, and that in light wind, he needed a wing person. He declined again, aggressively. Nonetheless, another pilot grabbed his wingtip. He had a launch and a good tow. I do not believe he even knew that there was someone on his wing. He was extremely focused on getting as many tows as possible, even hurrying his ground crew when they were checking to see if the line was clear of tangles.

The Flight
Pilot got ready for another tow. He was again told that he needed a wing-person. This time he expressly stated that he did not want one. Nevertheless, since his wings kept moving significantly in roll, another pilot took hold of his wing and started to run with him. This pilot had no experience with this process and stopped after only a couple of jogging steps. A second or two after the running pilot let go, the Atos left wing went up. The glider was still on the cart, and not yet to flying speed. The wing went way up. The nose of the glider went way up and it came off of the cart. From my perspective (behind and to the right a bit) it appeared that the nose was at a 40-60 degree angle to the horizon. It also appeared that the wing was at a 30-40 degree angle in roll to the horizon. Then the wing accelerated in an aggressive yaw, slamming the pilot to the ground. It appeared to be a classic lockout, but the glider never was really going fast enough to fly, or if so, just barely. At the last second, the nose came down, so that the pilot skidded in on his shoulder instead of smashing in head first.

[stebbins]

PART II ----

I don't know if the pilot made any inputs that affected the way he hit. I couldn't tell.

911 was called and the pilot was kept from getting up. He clearly had a concussion and serious shoulder injuries. The paramedics claimed that he likely had a "shattered shoulder" and a concussion. The seemed to think that was all, but of course couldn't guarantee that. Response time was pretty good from the emergency crews. Pilot was taken out via a helicopter. His fellow pilots called another Atos pilot for instructions on how to break his glider down, and did the best they could. Nobody else present had any idea how to break it down.

Evaluation:
Pilot clearly had no understanding of the fact that aerodynamic controls don't work unless there is air-flow over the wing. He repeatedly refused advice that he needed someone to assist him in roll control until he had sufficient airspeed to control his wing. Earlier aborted flight should have demonstrated that other (more experienced) pilots were right and that he needed the wing person. Pilot refused other safety related advice also - not always politely. Pilot was trying to get as many tows in as possible, perhaps pushing too hard. Light winds with some crossing gusts made the need for a wing-person even more important.

It is my strong belief that this accident was overwhelmingly caused by two things: Attitude & Ignorance. Whether that was from a desire to get as many tows as possible or a belief that he knew better than the flex wing pilots or just general "get-outa-my-face" stubbornness, who can say? But the repeated refusal of advice from (extremely) more advanced pilots was the key to this accident. All day I had heard others say that he was too aggressive, wouldn't listen and that they hoped he wouldn't get hurt. As for ignorance, the pilot clearly didn't understand the basic control mechanism of his glider. I suspect that if he had not been a flex-wing pilot originally, he might have more easily understood the fact that a rigid wing of that nature has essentially no roll control without working aerodynamic surfaces. And he might have understood that those surfaces don't work when there is insufficient airspeed and/or too high an angle of attack. This was a completely preventable accident.

On a side note, it might have been appropriate for the tug pilot to refuse to tow an Atos without a wing-person in such conditions. Given the self-regulated nature of our sport, that might be too much to ask, but it certainly wouldn't have hurt. And it might have driven home to the pilot-in-command that he needed to listen. "Do it the right way, or I'm not towing you. Those are the rules. My plane, my rules. Period." Nonetheless, the pilot in command WAS told how to prevent this repeatedly by people that he knew to be more experienced than he was. And he was the Pilot-In-Command.

[stebbins]

On a related note:

When someone is injured like this, please don't move them, offer them water or such. If they are breathing and not bleeding, then the best thing that you can do for them is keep them still, keep them warm and get the professionals there as soon as possible. It is quite possible for someone to have no loss of feeling and no loss of motion, but still have a broken neck or back. It happened to a friend of mine once. The only thing that saved him from being a quadriplegic was that someone at the scene forcibly kept him flat on the ground. His neck was completely broken, but the nerve bundle had not been injured other than some small bruising. He ended up with some loss of feeling in his pinky finger. His doctor told him to get on his knees and thank the first responder for keeping him from moving right after the accident.

And if you ever have the opportunity to take first responder training? Take it. I think it would be a good thing for the BOD to see if they could arrange for such a class for SHGA members.

[ericbrown]

Thanks for the writeup, George. As a first hand witness, it was an extremely sobering event to see. I think first responder training for SHGA members is a great idea. I called 911 and was really clueless about what exactly to tell them. Although it didn't seem to matter as a whole armada of emergency vehicles showed up. Still it would be good to be well prepared for unfortunate events like these.

I hope he's recovering well.

[stebbins]

Thanks for the writeup, George. As a first hand witness, it was an extremely sobering event to see. I think first responder training for SHGA members is a great idea. I called 911 and was really clueless about what exactly to tell them. Although it didn't seem to matter as a whole armada of emergency vehicles showed up. Still it would be good to be well prepared for unfortunate events like these.

I hope he's recovering well.

BTW, whoever's idea it was to send one of the pilot vehicles to the entrance of the lakebed to meet the emergency vehicles ----

Way to go! Brilliant! They could easily have gotten confused and gone from ultralight encampment to motorcycle encampment to powered paragliding encampment....

One piece of info they will ALWAYS want is where they should go. Address if possible, good directions if not, GPS maybe, but probably that wouldn't help.

And whoever thought to call Larry Chamblee for directions on folding up the Atos... Also a great idea. It never occured to me. I would have just "winged it" so to speak.

[Don]

I'm curious if Dennis was towing strickly from his harness or if the tow line was connected at two points - harness and carabineer?

Also, if strickly from the harness, would this have added to the complexity of launching and why?

I had a brief discussion about this with Jay on Saturday but I don't fully understand the dynamics of what is happening.

Don

[stebbins]

I'm curious if Dennis was towing strickly from his harness or if the tow line was connected at two points - harness and carabineer?

Also, if strickly from the harness, would this have added to the complexity of launching and why?

I had a brief discussion about this with Jay on Saturday but I don't fully understand the dynamics of what is happening.

Don

Interesting question. I have a recollection that he talked about using the pro-tow (harness only). I could easily be mistaken. I DO know that several pilots stated that he had NO backup release and didn't want one. The statement he supposedly gave was that his hook knife was his backup and it was infallible. Again, I did not inspect his release(s) myself, but that is what was said on-site, that day.

Does anyone KNOW what attachment method he used? Does anyone KNOW if he had a backup release? (I'm pretty sure he didn't, but not positive.)

On an Atos, I don't think that there is anywhere to put the v-pull on the glider except on the hang-point attachment (carabiner.) If that is true, then unlike a single surface glider, there isn't any significant nose-down force added to the tow. At first glance such a force might have helped, but I doubt it would have helped much. His left wing was very high, his right one very low, and his nose was very high also. Even if his nose was half as high, the spoilerons would have still been in the rotor of his highly stalled wing, and thus unable to affect his out-of-control roll. Personally, I think that the only thing that MIGHT have saved him was to hold onto the cart with his uphill hand and release with his downhill hand. If that had happened extremely rapidly, he'd have stayed mostly on the cart and it would have stayed mostly on the ground. But he'd have had to be extremely fast to pull that off. On second thought, I think he could have done it. It would still have been a crash, but it would likely have been more of a spin along the ground with road rash (cart rash?) than what happened. When in doubt, pin off. When in doubt, don't leave the cart, and pin off. Those are the main rules for towing takeoffs.

Detailed analysis of the pro-tow vs v-pull is more than I want to go into here. But here is a (very) quick overview.

On a Falcon-like glider, the nose-down force from the v-pull is significant and helpful. The Falcon doesn't really "want" to fly that fast, so pulling in can be hard. Putting the v-pull farther forward on the keel helps pull the nose down and thus lower the pitch-down that the pilot needs to input while on tow. You can put the line too far forward, though. I've not seen it, but have heard of it happening. It is not good. On faster gliders, the nose-down force isn't really needed, so people put the v-pull at the carabiner and put the VG on part way. Or they use a pro-tow, as I usually do.

But most use a backup release, just in case, regardless of the setup. Lines sometimes wrap around the tow hook-up point. A backup can save you from those (rare) problems. And releases do (very) occasionally jam.

Forces are lighter on the pilot with a v-pull. Every time one divides the ropes, one divides the forces. So the tow force on the pilot is about 1/2 as much with the v-pull as with the pro tow. Consequently there is a difference in how weak the weak link should be. Or it can be placed differently to compensate, as is often done. Weak link placement is, of course, important if the forces vary depending upon how many lines are used....

This is NOT a full description, just some key points. I'm not sure I'm qualified to give a full description, but I do understand these key points. I hope they help. If you have specific questions, I can try and answer them. Or post them, and someone who know might be able to answer them.